Clipboard security statistics (2026)

Apps caught reading clipboards

• In March 2020, security researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk reported that dozens of popular iPhone and iPad apps, including TikTok, were quietly reading the pasteboard every time they opened. Source (2020)
• When Apple shipped the iOS 14 paste notification in mid-2020, it flagged TikTok plus 53 other apps reading the clipboard on launch, turning previously invisible behavior into a visible banner. Source (2020)
• TikTok was reading the clipboard repeatedly, not just once on open, and stopped the behavior in an app update after iOS 14 exposed it. Source (2020)
• In March 2023, Microsoft’s security team reported that an older version of the SHEIN Android app, which has over 100 million downloads, periodically read the device clipboard and, when it matched a pattern, sent the contents to a remote server. SHEIN removed the behavior after it was reported. Source (2023)

Clipboard-hijacking (clipper) malware

Clipper malware watches your clipboard for something valuable, most often a cryptocurrency wallet address, and silently replaces it with the attacker’s address so a payment you paste goes to the wrong place.

• In September 2024, Binance issued a public advisory warning of an ongoing clipper malware threat, noting a spike in activity around August 27, 2024, and that the majority of attacks target mobile users because typing a wallet address by hand is so awkward there. Source (2024)
• The technique is not new. In 2022, researchers documented a clipboard hijacker (Laplas Clipper) that swaps a copied wallet address for a lookalike, with observed samples growing from under 20 a day to 55 in the space of a month. Source (2022)

We have not found a credible, specific dollar figure for total losses to clipboard-swapping malware, so we do not quote one. The verifiable takeaway is that this is an active, tracked threat, and that copy-paste is the exact moment it exploits.

What each operating system does about it

• iOS. Since iOS 14 (2020), the system shows a banner when an app reads text from the clipboard, which is what exposed the 2020 wave of snooping apps in the first place. Source (2020)
• Android background block. Since Android 10 (API 29), an app cannot read the clipboard unless it currently has focus or is the default keyboard, so background apps are blocked from reading it at all. Source (2019)
• Android toast.Since Android 12 (API 31), when an app reads clipboard data that came from a different app, the system shows a toast reading “[App] pasted from your clipboard.” Source (2021)
• Web browsers. Reading the clipboard with the Async Clipboard API is gated behind a clipboard-read permission and must originate from a user gesture such as a click or keypress, so a page cannot silently read what you copied. Source (2020)
• Windows and macOS. Neither desktop OS notifies you when a local app reads the clipboard. Any program you run can read it silently, which is precisely the gap the mobile notifications were built to close. You can confirm this from the platform clipboard APIs, which any process can call without a prompt (Windows GetClipboardData (docs) and macOS NSPasteboard (docs)).

Workplace and healthcare copy-paste

The clipboard is not just a security surface, it is a heavily used tool in serious work, which is part of why its contents can be so sensitive.

• A 2017 JAMA Internal Medicine study of 23,630 inpatient progress notes from 460 clinicians found that in a typical note only 18% of the text was typed fresh, while 46% was copied and 36% was imported from elsewhere in the record. Source (2017)
• The ECRI Institute and its Partnership for Health IT Patient Safety have described copy-and-paste in electronic health records as widespread and often underreported, and published safe-practice recommendations to reduce the patient-safety errors it can cause. Source (2017)

What this means for you

Put the pieces together and the picture is simple. On a desktop, any app you run can read your clipboard without telling you. That is not a bug in one program, it is how Windows and macOS work. Your clipboard passes through passwords, one-time codes, private messages, wallet addresses, and whatever you happened to copy last.

A clipboard manager sits right in the middle of this, because it is itself an app that reads everything you copy. That is the whole point of it, and it is also exactly why the design matters. A manager that keeps your history in plain text on disk, or syncs it through a server that can read it, widens the surface. Local-first storage and end-to-end encryption are what keep the convenience without handing your history to anyone else.

That is the line Relic tries to hold. Every item is encrypted on your device with XChaCha20-Poly1305 and Argon2id before it is saved or synced, so the stored history and the sync server only ever hold ciphertext that we cannot read. To be honest about scope: the desktop client is live on Windows today, other desktop platforms are in beta, and on phones Relic is a browse-and-search companion rather than a background recorder, because mobile operating systems (the same ones adding the protections above) do not let apps capture the clipboard in the background.

Frequently asked questions